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Abstrac t:
Models of decision making based on statistical decision theory have been
suggested as a basis for evaluating accounting information systems. This
paper uses an inquiry systems (versus decision model) perspective to introduce
a four level model for evaluating an information system. The four levels include
implementation, formulated problems, world views, and individual meaning systems.
Some extensions of previous work with statistical decision theory are introduced
to more completely address evaluation needs at the formulated problem level. A
method for evaluating informational impacts at the world view level is then
developed. At this level of analysis, information is seen to increase as well
as decrease the decision maker's internal conflict over the correctness of the
formulated problem. This effect does not possess the same properties as
uncertainty reduction through state probability revisions at the formulated
problem level. Finally some paradoxes in the use of analytical models for
evaluating information systems are identified.
This paper is a draft, please do not reference without author's permission.
Comments are welcome and will be appreciated.
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Introduction
The need for information system evaluation is well established in
accounting thought.
Much, if not most, accounting research is aimed at some
facet of the general problem of determining what infor-
mation should be supplied to a particular decision maker
in a particular decision context. Broadly viewed, this
is a choice (or decision) situation, and the research
in question is concerned with ultimately discovering the
"optimum" set of information for the particular decision
setting. [9, p. 623}
Using the context of statistical decision theory, models for eval-
uating alternative information systems have been developed by Feltham
[8J, Demski [5,6], Feltham and Demski [9], and others [7,13,22,27].
Mock [22] has criticized that work as focusing on a narrow aspect
of the total decision making process—the choice of actions in a well
formulated problem, with a narrow concept of information—the revision
of state probability estimates. He goes on to suggest that learning
effects be incorporated into the value of information, and proposes a
model value of information (the value of an improved model of the under-
lying relationships between actions and states of nature) and an action
effectiveness value of information (the value of an improved understanding
of the effectiveness and efficiency of alternative actions).
Building on that suggestions this paper views the information
system as an inquiring system, and relates the value of information to
the process of inquiry. Thus, it attempts to evaluate an information
system in a broader perspective. It does not focus on the choice made
by a decision maker with a given level of experience in a formulated
problem situation, but attempts to build a model of information usage
at multiple levels in the inquiry process.
Digitized by the Internet Archive
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It is a tentative and exploratory study that can, at best, hope to
sketch out the domain and difficulties of an expanded approach to
information evaluation.
We assume the information system user is engaged in a process of
inquiry, or the generation of knowledge useful in action to achieve goals.
He acts on the basis of an existing comprehension of his organizational
reality, and strives to improve that comprehension. Re is engaged in
formulating problems as well as in solving them, in inventing solutions
as well as in selecting among them, and is actively building an under-
standing of the world around him to use as a basis for formulating prob-
lems and making choices.
We propose a four-level model for evaluating information systems.
The four levels extend from interaction in an organization context to
the meaning of that interaction for an individual decision maker. Level
one is the decision maker's implementation of action choices. Level two
is the formulated problem which served as a framework for making the
action choice. Level three is the world view (Weltanschauung) of the
decision maker—the underlying assumptions and beliefs through which he
interprets levels one and two. Level four is the meaning of data for
the individual—the conjoining of a datum and a world view into a "fact"
for the individual.
The model is used as a basis for defining the types of information
and learning processes that must be taken into account in evaluating an
information system. Statistical decision theory, as currently formulated,
is discussed as a partial method for valuing information at the formulated
problem level of the proposed model. An extension of statistical decision
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theory to allow for act dependent states and uncertain outcomes in the
formulated problem is explored, and the need for evaluating information
at the world view level of our model is introduced,
In sketching out this expanded analysis of the information evaluation
problem, we are quickly confronted with the series of paradoxes in the
use of our analytical techniques. All four levels of the model are in-
volved in the process of inquiry by an individual information system user,
but each analytical technique addresses only one level of the model.
Further, each analytical technique, in order to be tractable, denies the
process of inquiry at the next higher level of analysis*—yet, in order
to be "rational" each technique relies on the "truth" of previous inquiry
at the next highest level. Finally, the fourth level of analysis (mean-
ing for the individual) is a question of personal knowledge and can neither
be made explicit nor exhaustively enumerated, yet its explicit enumeration
is the basis for the "rationality" of any analytical technique of infor-
mation evaluation.
One suggestion for solving these apparent paradoxes is to shift the
attention of information system evaluation away from the information and
toward the system. That is, we have traditionally assumed that the value
of an information system is to be found in its content, and information
analysis has attempted to define the "correct" or "optimum" data for the
system to produce. An alternative is to evaluate the information system
as a process of inquiry. We then move from asking ourselves "What data
gives the 'optimum' answer to a decision maker's question?," to asking
ourselves "What is the nature of the decision maker's inquiry process
—
how is his question being asked?"
•
-4-
Thus, we propose the need to identify classes of problems 'which
must be addressed by a decision maker, and inquiry processes that are
available to address those problems. The modes of inquiry displayed by
alternative information systems (defined to include the user as part of
the system) in relation to the types of problems that must be dealt with,
then becomes the basis for evaluating information systems.
The paper is in five sections. We first define our information
system user and his organization context. Second, we present our model
for information evaluation. In section three, we extend statistical
decision theory for act dependent states and uncertain outcomes. Section
four introduces meta decision theory and some types of inquiry systems.
Section five gives an example of one type of inquiry system (Hegelian)
for a traditional accounting problem, draws conclusions, and makes sug-
gestions for further work*
*• The Information System User in Context
A. The User as An Active Inquirer
We begin by making explicit our assumptions about man as an infor-
mation system user and the organizational context in which he operates.
The model of man as decision maker prevailing in accounting literature
today is one of homeostatic self-maintenance. The individual is pictured
as passively accepting a problem situation. With a given level of know-
lege and experience, he seeks to close gaps between the desired and the
actual 6tate of affairs. The problems he is presented with are primarily
well structured, with known problem formulations, known solution methods,
and a recognized "best" solution.
.
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Our analysis begins with the assumption that man is active in defin-
ing the problems he will address rather than passive in accepting problems,
He is engaged in a constant process of inquiry to obtain knowledge useful
in setting and achieving goals. As a problem solver, the individual is
an active sense maker as well as a decision maker. That is, he must build
an understanding of his situation, as well as exercise that understanding
in an action choice decision*
As Michael Polanyi aptly phrased it:
There is a purposive tension from which no fully awake
animal is free. It consists in a readiness to perceive
and to act, or, more generally speaking, to make sense
of its own situation, both intellectually and practi-
cally. From these routine efforts to retain control of
itself and of its surroundings, we can see emerging a
process of problem solving, when the effort tends tc
fall into two stages, a first stage of perplexity.
followed by a second stage of doing and perceiving
which dispels this perplexity. [25, p. 89]
From the viewpoint of an actively inquiring or sense making user,
an information system is not only a source of stimuli to which he responds
with choices, but is also a medium through which he builds an understand-
ing (a personal comprehension) of the organizational reality which lies
beyond hie immediate senses.
This perspective emphasizes his active involvement in shaping his
attention to and understanding of the world. An information system user
is constantly building &nd testing a comprehension of his environment
that will allow him to interact effectively with it. We are, therefore,
interested in evaluating the role of an information system not only for
making choices within a given sense of the world, but also its role for
making a sense cf the world.

An Information system user, acting on the basis of a comprehension ?
inquires (improves his comprehension) by posing questions and problems
for himself. Situations which appear to challenge his existing compre-
hension, or which be anticipates might serve to more fully develop his
comprehension, are attended to as problematic* The information system
user actively creates and develops problem formulations from these prob-
lematic situations which he has identified or found thrust upon him*
While decision making may be approached as a discrete activity, inquiry
may not. It is a continuous, all-pervasive process. Learning may be
a subordinate category of the decision making perspective, but it is a
constitutive category of the inquiry perspective.
B. The Context for Inquiry
The information system user is situated in an organizational context.
Kis responsibilities include the setting of goals and objectives, and
the defining of mission and policy priorities, as well as planning and
controlling for the efficient and effective use of resources in light
thereof. He must make a coherent sense of both social and technical pro-
i
cesses as they relate to multiple facets of the firm's environment. x He
searches for opportunities or necessities to act* designs potential action
alternatives based on his understanding of the "reasons why", and chooses
2from among the alternatives.
The problems he confronts range from well-structured, as discussed
above, to ill-structured. For the ill-structured problem, a proper for-
mulation is not known, a solution procedure is not known, and a "good"
solution cannot be defined in advance of its development.
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The organizational functions an information system user must perform
include production (basic task accomplishment); maintenance (mediating
task and human needs); boundary spanning (obtaining market, social , finan-
cial and governmental support for the firm); adaptive (research, planning
and coping with change); and managerial (allocating resources^ resolving
conflicts, coordinating subsystems, and coordinating environmental input
3
and output). The vast majority of these functions result in problems
which are ill-structured rather than well-structured.
A difficulty arises as to how statistical decision theory, which
assumes well-structured problems, proves useful in evaluating information
systems for inherently ill-structured problems*
This difficulty is analogous to one confronted by J. D» Thompson in
Organizations in Action [33] « Using a systems perspective, he questioned
how classic organization theory which assumed a closed system view and
modern organization theory which assumed an open system view could both
be persuasively argued. A closed system perspective holds that the number
of elements to be taken into account can be exhaustively enumerated, that
cause and effect relations between elements can be adequately understood,
and that all influences for change can be predicted or controlled. An
open system perspective, on the other hand, realizes that the number of
elements that are relevant in a given situation cannot be exhaustively
enumerated, that cause and effect cannot be explicitly known, and that
change comes from influences we neither understand nor control.
He reconciles these two apparently contradicting viewpoints by pro-
posing that organizations (and, we would hold, information system users)
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are open systems, but are striving to meet an expectation or norm of
rationality. He argues that organizations limit the inputs, outputs
and processes they will allow, decouple differentiated components of
the organization as semi-isolated units, and maintain buffers between
units to further reduce their interaction, In effect, they formulate
a solvable problem through decomposition* As a result, the total un-
certainty of the situation is reduced, and a relatively closed system,
amenable to traditional rational organization theory is created.
We feel this argument also applies to the user of an information
system. That is, the user is an open system facing more potentially
relevant variables than he can take into account at one time, and facing
cause and effect relations and outside sources of change that lie beyond
his limited ability to understand, Re strives for rationality, however,
and artificially closes his problem space to that which can be adequately
dealt with by closed system standards of rationality similar to statis-
4
tical decision theory.
Our model for evaluating information systems focuses not on a
particular relatively closed problem formulation, but on the process
by which an individual formulates problems, takes action, assesses con-
sequences and reformulates problems as a basis for further action. It
recognizes that any given problem formulation is the temporary relative
closure of an inherently open question as a basis for taking "rational"
action. Information evaluation must attend to this larger process as
well as formulated problems if the value of information is to be fully
explored.

II. A Multi level Model fo r Information Evaluation
We propose a four-level model of the Individual information system
user. He is implementing decisions in an organizational context (level
one), through a framework of attention or a problem formulation (level
two) which is developed from the perspective of a world view or his
underlying assumptions and beliefs (level three) in order to gain mean-
ing from, and give meaning to, his experience (level four). The basic
5
model is depicted in Figure !•
The information system user is in the process of interacting with
his environment. Ke is attending to a limited number of elements and
relationships in his environment > and interprets the signals he receives
through a world view. He makes sense of his situation by identifying
the elements and relations to be taken into account (formulating his
problem) and taking action in light of what he attends to (solving his
problem).
Each higher level of the model becomes successively less available
for formalized analysis. First, on the dimension of observability, imple-
mentation actions of the information system user are observable, but his
problem formulation, world view and personal meaning, are not. Next,
while we could argue the ability to exhaustively enumerate his implemen-
tation behavior, or his currently formulated problem, we could not claim
to exhaustively enumerate his world view or his personal meaning—at the
very least because of their symbolic nature. Finally, while we could
argue, that implementation, problem formulation, and world views could
be stated explicitly, the basis of personal meaning remains tacit.

The model is hierarchical to emphasize the following relations be-
tween levels:
1) each higher level serves as a basis for selectively retain-
ing or eliminating data at the next lower level,
2) higher levels are revised in light of feedback from lower
levels,
3) lower levels experience change and revision at a faster fre-
quency than higher levels * and
4) as a result, higher levels serve as a source of stability,
integrity, or rationality for lower levels.
Before discussing the dynamics of the model and some modes of inquiry
that relate to it, we will use the model as a framework for identifying
three types of information and two types of learning that must be taken
into account.
In our model, data is transmitted up, and actions are transmitted
down* Actions are here taken to mean the development of world views, the
formulation of problems 4 and the calculation of solutions (or action
choices) as depicted in Figure 1. To characterize the types of informa-
tion which link the four levels of the model we draw on Ma ru yama [14],
He identifies three levels of information that organize the universe in
our thought processes—the classificational level of information, the
relational level of information, and the relevantial level of information.
The classificational level of information consists of substances
that persist in time and obey the laws of identity and mutual exclusive-
ness. It is a categorical classification of items as "something". It
is noun oriented, discrete and objectively determinable. The categories

-11-
in the classification scheme are mutually exclusive through hierarchically
formulated as subdivisions in a multi-criteria classification scheme. For
our model, information which flows from implementation to the formulated
problem is classification! information. It is the information the deci-
sion maker attends to.
The relational level of information is event oriented rather than
thing oriented. Definition is given by interactions and interrelations
as "how does it relate to other things". At this level of information,
mutuality of causations and interactions are possible, and subjectivity
is as important as objectivity in seeking "truth". This level consists
of the potential relationships that may be taken into account by an in-
dividual. For our model, information linking the formulated problem
level and the world view level is relational information. It is the
individuals information as to how things are and how things work.
At the relevsntial level of information, definition rests with the
unique concerns of the individual, and varies between individuals. The
concern is with existential meaning for the individual, and the infor-
mation may be used for self-centered, other-centered or dominant-
submissive reasons. The relevsntial level of information is situational
and used in immediate action. At this level, using Vickers' terminology
[36], the individual merges value judgments with reality judgments in
making action judgments. Information which links the world view level
to the meaning level is relevantial information. It is the basis for
the individual's assertion of self through action in a specific situation.
If the objective is to evaluate an information system as it relates
to the implementation of action choices, then all three levels of
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information must be evaluated* As we will see in the next section, how-
ever, information evaluation in accounting literature has dealt only with
the classificational level of information in isolation from the other
levels.
We can also use the model as a basis for discriminating at least two
types of learning, Here* we will draw on the distinction Argyris [2]
makes between single loop and double loop learning. By single loop learn-
ing he refers to learning that goes on within a given problem framework.
Goals, objectives, values and underlying assumptions of the current prob-
lem formulation are not questioned, and learning is in tYie form of in-
creased efficiency and effectiveness in processes for solving the formulated
problem, Double loop learning, by contrast ? refers to a questioning and
revision of goals, values and implicit assumptions which underlie the prob-
lem as it is currently formulated. Double loop learning, in turn, leads
to a fundamental rather than cosmetic reformulation of the problem.
For our model, single loop learning takes place at the level of the
formulated problem, while double loop learning effects both the world view
and the problem formulation. Two points should be made here. First, as
before, information evaluation in accounting literature has dealt with
only one type of learning—single loop learning, but both types must be
evaluated in judging the impact of an information system.
For the problem solving process, we have accepted that man's limited
cognitive ability necessitates the framing of problems by elminating all
the elements and relations involved in the situation which are not seen
as essential. The formulated problem can then always be criticized as
incomplete, as indeed it always must be. But it is because the formulated
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problem is simplified and incomplete that calculation of a solution is
possible. Tliis type of incompleteness of the formulated problem is not
an issue in this paper. Calculation of the solution to the explicitly
formulated and fully enumerated problem is a trivial exercise. But
problem solving does not consist of calculation alone.
Thompson [34] , drawing on the work of Duncker and Wertheimer
concludes that the problem solving process consists of a series of
proposals.
Each proposal is a re-formulation of the problem. The
basis of a new hypothesis is the flexible shifting of
all the factors which make up the problem situation in
relation to each other. „ . The achievement of this re-
organization is brought about by varying the mode of
attack, changing the basic concept in terms of which
the situation is described and interpreted, and chang-
ing the principles upon which the hypotheses or "leads"
are framed, [pp* 50-53]
Getzeis and Czikszentmihalyi [10] in their work on creative problem
solving have concluded that it is a result of an individual's problem
finding ability. They argue that the ability to reformulate problems is
the source of creative problem solutions*
That problem solving requires problem reformulation is not a critical
weakness in an information evaluation process that requires a given problem
formulation, for we could always reformulate the evaluation framework itself
over time.- There is evidence to suggest . however > that the process of
learning in problem reformulation requires the dynamic interplay of multiple
world views. Schroder, Driver &nd Streufert [30] identify an individuals
degree of integrative complexity as the major variable in human problem
solving. For our purposes, it is important to note that high integrative
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complexity involves the use of multiple world views for interpreting
a situation. In fact, not only are multiple world views involved, but
the functional relations between the multiple world views used to generate
multiple simultaneous interpretations of a situation are explored by a
problem solver with high integrative complexity. It appears, then, that
while problem reformulation is a key factor in problem solving, Information
evaluation in accounting assumes a fixed problem formulation, and while
effective problem solving and learning by an individual involves the
dynamic interplay of multiple world views, statistical decision theory
assumes a given world view.
In the next section we will review statistical decision theory as
it has been applied to the information evaluation problem in the account-
ing literature.
III. Information at the Formulated Problem Level
Statistical decision theory (SDT) as used in the accounting litera-
ture evaluates an information system at the formulated problem level.
This section reviews that evaluation process, identifies some technical
limitations in the current SDT paradigm, and explores the removal of
some of those limitations. In light of the discussion in sections one
and two, some conceptual problems in dealing with information value at
the world view level are discussed. These conceptual problems are dealt
with in the next section.
A general model of a formulated action-choice (AC) problem (within
the SDT framework) can be stated as:
[A, S, , U, Z | 0)
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where
A = (a)
S rr (s)
$ =: {$}
z « {z}
u
Q
is the set of acts available to the decision
maker (DM)
is the set of payoff relevant states of nature
is the set of probability functions
is the set of outcomes, normally defined by
the ac testate pair p(a , ,s.) * z.,
is the value system on Z
is the DM's view of the world based on which Q
the components of the AC problem are specified*'
The AC problem is to select an act, a4 z A, such that the DM's expected
10
utility is maximized. " In symbols, select the optimal act, a*, such
that
ED' (a*) > EU(a.) for all a. e A (1)
— i l
where
EU(a.) - I UCz^HCs.la,) 11
The value of an information system under this framework (SDT) is defined
as the increase in the DM's expected utility due to his ability to take
different acts based on the signals generated by the information system,
Let a, « a*jy.,n such that
EU(a*) * EU(a*|y.,rO
* Max I V(z.^(sja^y f n) (2)
aeA s
J*J J

-16-
where y is the signal received from the information system n
Then, the expected utility of the DM if he chooses to use the information
system n is:
EU<a*jrj) - I EU<a*)4(yjT0 (3)
y
* I [Max I u(z ><Ks ia
1 *y 3 ,n}j<Hy jt !n)
y aeA s "- J
and the expected value of the information system r\ 1st
V(n) - EU(a*|n) - EU(a*) 12 (4)
Then the information systems choice problem is to select the system r\*
such that:
V(n*) > V(tl) for all neXK (5)
If an information system can predict the occurrence of the payoff relevant
states with certainty, we call the information system "perfect". The value
of a perfect information system (ru) can be calculated as:
V(n
p
) « I U(z*)<t>(yJnJ ~ EU(a*) (6)
y
where zA is the outcome of the act state pair (a.,8.),
and s„ is the state predicted by the signal y,.
The V(rip) is the maximum value of any information system for the formu-
lated AC problem. The measure can also be interpreted as the (opportunity)
cost of uncertainty in the formulated problem. That is, the decision
maker "lost the opportunity" to enjoy the utility of optimal acts due to
uncertainty of the states of nature.
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We can now relax an assumption stated in the standard SDT formulation:
certain outcome prediction. Up to this point, we have assumed a homomor-
phic mapping of the act-state pair into the outcome space (i.e.,
p(a. ,s^) * z. ,)« I** an actual decision situation, this assumption is
not likely to held true (e.g., profit for a given amount of sales). Thus,
we let the (a.,s.) pair map into the outcome space Z with corresponding
1 J
probabilities for the elements of 2: p(a.„s.) + Z ~ #(z,
i
s4»s<).
Then the expected utility measures need to be adjusted as given
below:
EU(a ) - I [E U(zk)$(2.|ai,s1 )J#C»1 |*1)
s z
£U(a*} = Max Z [I U(a.J$(z. |a4 ,s,) U(s. |a.)
aeA s z j j
EU(a*) - EtJ(a*|y
£ ,n)
* Max £ [I UCz^KsJa^s ,y c ,rO]<Ks la^y^r.)
aeA s z 3 J
EU(a*in> - Z EU(a*)4(y
£ h)
y
« £ {Max 2 [ro(sk)*(2k |al,«1 ,yJlf T|)]*
y aeA s 2 **
V(rO * EU(a*jrt ) - EC(a*) (7)
Equation (?) is more comprehensive than the standard SDT formulation
since it incorporates uncertain outcomes as well as act dependent states
of nature. Consequently, the problem specification requirements are
more extensive. The additional specification requirements include the
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prior probabilities and the rules to revise them after the receipt of
information. Under the standard form the necessary probability distri-
butions are: <KsO, <Ky,,|n) and 4>(y js.,!!) and ail the necessary
probability revisions are performed according to Bayes T rule."
Under the expanded formulation given above* the specification re-
quirements are far more extensive and the probability revision rules are
more complex. Specifically^
(1) The state probability function needs to be specified for each act.
In fact, the marginal probability of the states of nature is mean-
ingless under this formulation, since one and only one act is to
be selected. Thus we need to specify ^(sja) for each aeA.
(2) The uncertain outcome assumption requires the DM to specify the prob-
ability measures ^(z\& f B) for each (a,s) pair in A,S»
(3) The interpretation of the term <Kyfn), catl De quite complex. If
the information system were to report the observations of past events,
the condition probability could be stated as:
s
where the S is the set of past states.
Note, however, the <Ks) is conditional on the past act selected
a. Therefore the entire expression <Kyjri) is conditional
~ 15
upon a.
If the information system were to report the values of an
experiment yet to be performed, then selection of the act (or acts)
to be used in the experiment, a , becomes another choice problem
e
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and the <Kyjn) is again conditional upon the act selected. The im-
pact of this dependence on the act selected (a or a ) upon the
e
probability revision process is discussed next.
(4) The condition probability <f>(s ja>y,rO needs to be elaborated upon.
Let us digress a moment and intuitively consider the role of infor-
mation in revising the act dependent state probabilities,. The prior
state probability <Ks{a) reflects two major components: (a) the
perceived action effectiveness in inducing the state [22], and (b)
the general likelihood of the state occurrence* The DM may find a
signal to be informative with regard to the action effectiveness
and/or the general likelihood of the state occurrence. There-
fore, the revision process of the state probabilities must be able
16
to reflect the potential impacts of information on both components.
Now let us consider the calculation process of <j-(sja,y,n). With-
out loss of generality, let us assume the information system reports
on the past state occurrence (s,a) as described in (3) above. The
probability revision can be calculated as follows.
^(s|a*y,in) * I 6(s is 9 a,a)<j»(s iy»n)
s
s
where s is the past state observed by the information system n
and a is the act taken in the last period.
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The second component ^^sly**!) refers to the accuracy of the
observation system n while the first component ${(s |a) | (s»a)] refers
to the informational impact of the past act taken, a, and the state
resulted, s, upon the evaluation of the future state probabilities 9
Schoner [29] has suggested a means to calculate the revised prob-
ability $[(s|a) j(s,a)J e One crucial requirement is that the DK
specify the probabilities of one state (s,) obtaining under one
act, (a.)« conditional upon the knowledge of states (s 4 or s )x j x,
obtaining under one or more other acts, (a,), <b[ (s, ja, } j (s 8 ,a, )},
which he calls cross-prior probabilities.
(5) The uncertain outcome formulation requires prior probabilities on
<Kz!a,s) for the Cartesian product of AxS* The impact of information
J
-7
is reflected in the revised probabilities $[(z|a,s) |y,n3«
The revision process is quite similar to the state probability re-
vision discussed above, except that the information system observes
the outcome (zjs,a) along with the (sja). The information
signal then could be thought of as the pair [r>(z js,a),n(s ja) 3
«
Some Reflections
Two points emerge from the above discussion: (1) an expanded view
of information system evaluation, and (2) some technical limitations of
SDT as a model for evaluating information systems.
(a) Under the expanded formulation incorporating uncertain outcomes
and act dependent states of nature, the potential value of infor-
mation is divided into three components:
i
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(1) the outcome mapping of the act state pairs, (2) the action
effectiveness evaluation, and (3) the general likelihood of the
state occurrence. These components were suggested earlier by
Mock [22], and are formalized in this paper
.
(b) To make this model operational, procedures for revising the
probabilities, $f(s |a) |y»Tj] and <f>[ (z ja,s) jy»r)] are necessary.
Unfortunately, standard Sayes* rule does not provide the means
for these revisions. In fact, only the act independent and
certain outcome cases can be handled by Bayes' Theorem and
consequently only the state likelihood component or information
can be evaluated under the standard SDT* This problem Is a
technical one (vs. conceptual) since its solution, once developed,
can fit into the basic framework of SDT.
Once the DM specifies ail the components listed above, he has a for-
mulated problem, If, however t we admit a question as to what criteria to
use in making those judgments, we have a meta theory decision problem.
This problem is at the world view level, and is a conceptual rather than
a technical problem. It is conceptual in that it lies beyond the standard
SDT framework. Information analysis at the formulated problem level, as
developed above, took place within a given world view (iiL) , information
value was in single loop learning, and only categorical level information
was considered. Since SDT assumed agreement on the assumptions behind
18
the formulated problem, we cannot use it to question those assumptions.
Type I and Type II errors can be discussed at the formulated problem
level only because agreement on the world view is assumed. To question
the world view we need to introduce the possibility of a Type III error
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(having formulated the wrong problem) . In order to address this question,
and the role of information in its resolution, we must appeal to a theory
that lies beyond SDT—a meta theory for SBT that evaluates information at
the world view level
.
IV* Information at the World View Level
The meta theory decision problem is "to discover a procedure for for-
mulating one*s decision theory problem [19 s p. 44]." At the formulated
problem level of our decision model, the DM J s view-of-the-world, Q~ was
assumed as given. The object of Inquiry in this section is the implication
of the conditioning elements fi on the formulated problem, and the impact
of information on the DM's viev~of-the-world * Up to this point, the
analysis assumed that the receipt of information did not cause the DM to
question the validity of the formulated AC problem. We now expand the
concept of learning to a higher-order of problem formulation (double loop
learning), and evaluate relational level Information. The analyses of Q
and the informational effects on ft cannot be stated within the statistical
decision theory paradigm, as pointed up by Kitroff and Betz [19, p. 44].
Criteria for making judgments required In applying
the logical form in any particular instance are out-
side the form itself and are hence extra-logical
(or meta-iogicai as the term is generally used). A
meta theory is another logical form (or a higher-order
logical form) for formulating the decision to formu-
late a decision problem.
The analysis reported here is at best preliminary and mainly consists of
assertions and hypotheses, which we hope can serve as a basis for further
research. We believe, however, that the impact of learning on a DM f s
vlew-of~the-world and the role of information in the learning process is
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quite important in evaluating potential information systems, and
warrants substantive research.
Churchman considers the passive nature of most information systems
to he their major weakness, as summarized by Mitroff: "In short,
most systems do not inspect the user*s underlying images of the world.
As a result, they are unable to examine how all the user's unstated and
unconscious assumptions profoundly affect the user's conception of his
own problem." [18, p. 634}
One type of meta theoretic approach to the application of SDT at
the formulated problem level is an inquiry systems framework first
developed by C. W. Churchman [3], and further elaborated by Mitroff
and Betz [19] , Mitroff and Pondy [21], and Mitroff, Betz and Mason
[20], It is a meta theory in the sense that it does not address the
solution to a formulated problem, but the process by which implementation,
formulated problems, world views and meaning systems interact as an
inquirying system. Types of inquiry systems differ as to their use
of sense data, consistent theory, multiple theories, and implementation
I s*
as a basis for establishing "truth", *
Hegelian or dialectical inquiring systems have been used by some
authors to explore changes in the BM*s world views [15 > 18, 19, 20} . For
an Hegelian dialectical inquirer, disagreement, not agreement, is the
method of conducting inquiry* Thus, learning takes place through debates
between strongly conflicting views on an issue. A dialectical inquiring
system has two expert debaters with opposing views debating for the
benefit of the decision maker. The DM then forms his own view by adopting
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or transforming the views expressed by the experts and incorporating
them into his previous view. We wish to evaluate the information system
based on its ability to take on the role of debaters, or alternatively,
its ability to induce the DM to consider other views. We start the
analysis with a discussion of the role and structure of a world view.
A. 0. - Weltanschauung
The Weltanschauung (view-of-the-world or world view) is the DM's
understanding of the logical relationship among variables. That is, as
the DM receives a datum y. 9 describing a past, present, or future event,
Idhe decodes the symbol y, into an information bit through his wor
view. Specifically," let Y be a set of "data" initially possessed by
the DM, Y » {y ,y , , . ,y }, let Q be a set of models (world views)i J. K
Ji » (w ,w
2 ,
» .«,w. }, and let x be an operator conjoining an element of
the set t with an elements of the set R, such that for every y.cY and
every w.eft, there exists one and only one element of a set F: y 4 xw -HE ,
The operator x is called the interpretative operator and the set F, which
we call the information set of a given ft, contains the "facts" as the DM
understand the y within the context of a given decision problem. Thus,
a "fact" cannot be separated from the DH ? s current view-of-the-world. Then,
the AC problem specification is based on the facts in Y
n
x fL * F
n ,
where the subscript indicates the present. That is, all the components
of the AC problem are specified based on the facts as they are known to
the DM at the time of problem formulation. We wish to evaluate the poten-
tial impact of new data y. i Y~ upon the world view Q~, and thus on
the "facts" Fn .u

Let us modify the structure of the world view somewhat and introduce
uncertainty as to the validity of some competing views. The DM does not
possess one world view, hut a set of views with credence attached to each
21
view in the set,"
Let fln = {C-w. , C w-,. # .C Dw9 ) s C'w
where w. is a unique view in the set
1
c is the credence attached to v.^
c > 0, and IC - i
In addition to the impact of information reflected in the AC problem for-
mulation, the receipt of a datum may change the DM f s world view and/or
change the "fact" known to the DM before the receipt of the datum. That
is, a datum may impact both the categorical and the relational levels of
information for the DM. Consider y.sY, £~ x y, -*- f . facts based on Qn ,
The fact f is actually a set of facte with credence attached to each of
them: Q
Q x y±
* {C^^ ,C
2
w
2 ,
. . . ,C
£
w^}x y^ * {C.^., ,C2f 2 > . . . ,C£f^L
Of course, it is possible for all the facts (f, ,£«,,..,
f
a ) to be the same,
in which case the DM has no uncertainty with respect to the meaning of the
datum y . Upon receipt of a datum y. i Y, the DM decodes the symbol into
information, &n x y. -> f. then checks the triple (y,»r^,f) for
- j y L»
reasonableness with respect to his personal meaning system* This filter-
ing process may indicate the credence vector needs to be revised in order
to accommodate the new datum and the interpreation of it. Recall that
the world view sets the criteria for a formulated problem specification.
The change in the world view, Q
n
to Q- , is equivalent to the change in
O X
one or more criteria for a formulated problem. The change could have the
effect of reducing uncertainty as to the proper view (conflict resolution)
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or it could actually increase uncertainty (conflict generation) and
induce the DM to seek additional information in order to reduce his
internal conflict, The effect of changes at the world view level can
result in different specifications cf the act space and the utility
assessment j as well as the components that vera subject to uncertainty,
at the formulated problem level. One should note that the change in
world view dictates a fundamental change in the formulated problem, and
the comparison of utility measures under two different world views is
invalid, analogous to the inter-personal utility comparison* The value
of information for world view le\rei changes cannot be evaluated based
on the utility measures of the given formulated problem. Therefore, we
are suggesting the magnitude of the changes (conflict reduction or genera-
tion) as a measure of the value of information in the. meta-decision theory
framework. We formalize the above discussion in the next subsection*
B. Value of Information in neta Theory
Consider a DM with initial world views and past Data Y,
% * *ciVC2w2*"-» C*wJt }
Then the AC problem specification is based on the Cu:
n x y -» {A ,s 0> z0) u ,y - *
The formulated problem -5 may be consistent with all the views in
ti* w. x Y -*• 6~ for all views w.eSL.* More likely, some views are
consistent with 6^. while others are not. Then the 6^ can be stated
as the AC problem with the greatest credence attached to it:
CgA - Max C^ - Max I c ig(w.,,6 4 ) (9)

— I
—
where g (w
.
, 6
.
) = 1 , if w, xl +q,
,
otherwise*
The credence attached to the formulated problem 6* is C.^ and the measure
(1-C*^) represents the magnitude of a DM's internal conflict as to the
correct specification of the formulated problem. Mitroff [18] refers to
the measure of conflict y » (i-C.,) as the Drobabilitv of an error of
the third kind: the error of formulating the wrong problem. The conflict
reducing role of information is to increase the credence attached to the
formulated problem. Thus, the maximum amount of conflict reduction that
can be expected given the current state of the DM ? s world-view is (1-C.^).
This measure is analogous to the expected value of perfect information
(V(n )) at the formulated problem level- That is, if a given informa-
tion system can reveal the ?, true environment" for the formulated problem,
the DM can adjust the credence vectors such that all the component speci-
22fications are consistent with each of the remaining views. Thus, the
conflict reducing value of information system n is:
1M - E[C ] - c
1
* E[Hax(C
(
, |n)] - Max C^
6sA j &z& i
- EfMax E(C.|n)g(w£»6
.
|n>] - Max I C^gCw.,6.) (10)
6sA w •3 oca v? *
x J
where 5* is the formulated problem at. time period i.
i
One should note that the value of information in (10) above does not
possess the same properties of the value of information at the formulated
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problem level as defined in equation (7). The conflict reducing value
(10) applies to the task of formulating the correct problem while the
traditional value (7) applies to the task of choosing an optimal act
given a formulated problem. Therefore, the two value measures cannot
be summed together to yield the total value of information*
Now, let vis consider the conflict generating role of information.
Hegel argues that synthesis (the meaning system level) does not exist
without prior conflict—ideas are generated out of opposition [3, p$*
170-179] • Therefore. the generation and/or recognition of conflict is
a necessary condition for a person to learn* Earlier we assumed a
datum could increase the credence (and decrease the conflict) attached
to a formulated problem. But a new datum can decrease the credence (and
increase the conflict) as well* That is- C * < C ^ which implies that
the DM is less convinced that the formulated problem is correct than he
was before the receipt of the datum, thus increasing the subjective
probability of the error of the third kind by C . ~ C . , Consequently,
WS W?
the amount of conflict reduction that can be received has increased to
(1-C A ) , The DM now has been motivated to search for conflict reducing
information » Note that the state of the DM ? s world views which maximizes
the conflict is where every formulated problem is equally credible;
CL = C f for every 6eA.
* j
Then the maximum expected conflict increasing value of information can
be stated as: C , - v where k is the number of <$£&» The motivation
role of information is to increase conflict such that the DM would be
motivated to generate new ideas at. the meaning system level while trying
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to resolve the conflict * While the mechanics of generating the measures
of conflict reducing and conflict increasing values of information are
the same, the two measures which only differ in sign, are fundamentally
different* While the first reduces internal conflicts for the DM, the
second provides the opportunity for additional conflict reduction in the
future.
While we were able to identify the measures and some properties of
information in me ta~theory^ we were not able to define the means to
systematically revise the credence measures based on information received,
Note that the formulated problem is conditional upon the DM*s world-views
being constant, and capable of being explicitly stated* Likewise, the
explicit specification of world view changes requires that our meaning
system be static, at least during the analysis, and be susceptible to
explicit specification, which we are not able to do under our current
state of knowledge. Thus, the means to include the conflict increasing
and decreasing role of information in an information system are mainly
conjectural and speculative (see Mitroff and Betz [19] and Mason [15]
for examples.)
In short, within the framework of SDT, the role of information is
defined as uncertainty reduction. In the framework of meta theory, the
role of information is not only in reducing conflict, but also in increas-
ing conflict. However, the explicit treatment of the world view revision,
and thus the impact of information, is not feasible under our current
state of knowledge.
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In the nest section we provide a simple example to illustrate the
various concepts discussed hers.
V, An Example of Information at the world View Level
A simple cost-volume-profit situation using a standard costing system
will illustrate the implications of a meta theory for information value.
The decision maker is the general manager of a manufacturing firm. Below
24
are some relevant assumptions for tne setting*
(1) objective? maximize profit
(2) major departments: manufacturing and marketing
(3) sales price: $51 per unit
(4) product cost (standard)
:
(a) (TC|w.) ° 160 + 47Q (world view 1)
(b) <Tejw? ) * 800 -4- 310 4- »10
Z (world view 2). 25
(5) based on the past data and the DH's educational background,
the DM attaches the credence measures of (*9, »1) to the world
views w- and w
?
respectively J £L * (.$w, , .iw,>)
.
(6) the current period sales is 110 units at $51 per unit.
(?) the actual production cost for the 110 units is $5 S 380,
Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 2 summarises the above assumptions. Also,
note that the two views (u and w«) did not conflict with each other
with respect to the interpretation of the past data (Figure 2), since
the standards based on the two views were quite similar. The report
of current period activities, however, raises a problem for the DM.
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Table 1: Basic Cost Standards
Standard Break-even Optimal Credence
Cost Quantity Quant itv Level
w
l
160+47Q 40 Unbounded .9
w
2
800f31Q+, 1Q
2
51;149 100{fr=$200) ,1
Sales
Cost
Profit
Cost Variance
Table 2 i Actual vs. Standards
Actual
$5,63,0
5,380
$ 230
w.
$5,610
$ 190
4OF
Taking the actual performance data as depicted in Figure 2 S let us
try to infer the "facts" that result from conjoining the actual data to
each of the alternative world views, separately.
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Linear World: w„ Quadratic World: w«
(1) The efficiency of the manufac-
turing department is question-
able, Investigate, not-
investigate decision should
be made.
(2) The worse than expected profit
realized during the period was
due to the manufacturing
department's inefficiency.
(3) Increased sales and sore ef-
fective cost control is the
means to increase profit in
the next period.
(4) The decision to continue pro-
ducing this product is depen-
dent upon market demand
projections compared to other
opportunities.
(1) The manufacturing department
was quite efficient. No need
to make, investigate, not-
investigate decision.
(2) The better than expected
profit was due to the manu-
facturing department's
efficiency.
(3) Reduced sales, to 100 units,
is the means to maximize
profit in the next period.
(L4) The decision to continue pro-
ducing this product is mainly
dependent upon the adequacy
of the maximum expected profit
of $200 compared to other
opportunities
Note that the "facts'" inferred from the cost accounting report are
radically different, depending on which view the DM adopts. It is
irrelevant which view is the correct one, in fact both of them could be
incorrect. The accounting report could lead to an increased internal
conflict in the DM's mind. While we cannot determine exactly how the
credence levels would be revised after the receipt of the accounting
report, it is likely that the credibilities attached to the views would
Of*
change, C,- vs. (C,jy,n).~
x X
Recall that the manager s s probability of an error of the third
kind (y) was zero in the past, since both views~o£-the-world yielded the
same standard cost criteria. The expected measure of v for future
periods was .1, since the linear world view (w ) had a credence of .9
under £ . The ex-post measure of v, (yJy,r;,Q ) is 1 - Max P(w. jy,n),
w
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which may be different from .l! E(vJ8 ) £(v|yf u»&n) « (yJ&,}.
If the ex-post measure (yjQ, } were smaller than the ex-ante measure
(yjQ }, the accounting report had a conflict reducing effect, and if the
ex-post measure were larger than the ex-ante measure, the information had
a conflict generating effect. Should the conflict increase s the DM is
likely to seek additional information to reduce the conflict. It is
argued that the accounting systems designer should explicitly consider
the impact of information at the world view level in addition to the
value of information at the formulated problem level*
Summary
We have introduced a multilevel model for the evaluation of infor-
mation systems, and focused our discussion on the value of information
at two of those levels-—the formulated problem level and the world view
level. The analysis has pointed out that the impact of information at
each level is fundamentally different
.
At the formulated problem level, ^ information has value to the ex-
tent that it reduces uncertainty under a standard SBI framework. While
our analysis has attempted, to point out some technical problems in the
probability revision process for act dependent and uncertain outcome
formulations, the uncertainty reduction value of information remains
valid.
At the world view level, however, the impact of information may
be conflict increasing or conflict decreasing for the individual*
While the same datum may have both information impacts
s
the uncertainty
and conflict changes are not additive, and there is no continuity of
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uncertainty between two formulated problems for the same Individual.
Each formulated problem results from the perplexity or conflict of a
different set of world views.
The value of information is tnu.it ifaceted, and a multifaceted eval-
uation technique, is required. An inquiry system perspective, which re-
lates the variety of the multilevel process presented here to the variety
required by the Implementation situation, is one direction that future
research might pursue. This would suggest research on the classes of
problems which must be Inquired about through the use of an information
system, and the inquirying capabilities of alternative information system
designs, with the user of the system as an integral part of the inquiring
capability assessment.
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Footnotes
x
This is essentially Anthony's description of strategic and
managerial planning [lj.
2
Here we are using Simon's [31] distinctions between Intelligence
(identifying the need to make a decision}* Design (developing alternative
courses of action) and Choice (selection of an alternative)*
3
This framework is in addition to the resource allocation problem
typically emploved and is based on Kats and Kahn's The Social Psychology
of Organizations , Wiley. 1966=
Cyert and March* s limited search, localized rationally and
sequentially attention to goals and March and Simon* s bounded rationality
are examples of this process of gaining "closure" by artificially limiting
the problem space [4,12]. Lawler and Rhode [11] also stress the need to
meet an "expectation"' of rationality in an organization context.
There are a number of analogous multi-level modela to repre-
sent the process of active sense making. For instance, Watzlawick*
Beavin and Jackson f 37 1 use a metaeommunicaiive framework, Osgood [23]
uses an encoding-decoding framework, Mead [16] uses a symbolic interaction
framework, Torbert [35] uses a level of consciousness framework and
Messarovic [17] uses a cybernetic control framework* Perhaps the best
source for justifying a multi-level hierarchical model of the information
system user is William James:
Looking back, then, over this review, we see thst the
mind is at every stage a theatre of simultaneous possi-
bilities. Consciousness consists in the comparison of
these, with each ether
s
the selection of some, and th&
suprression of rbe rest by the reinforcing and inhibit-
ing agency of attention. The highest and most elaborate
mental products sre filtered from the data chosen by the
faculty next beneath ? out of the mass offered by the
faculty below that, which mass in turn was sifted from
a still larger amount of yet simpler material, and so
on* The mind. In short, works on the data it receives
very much as a sculptor works as on his block of stone.
In a sense the statue stood there from eternity. But
there were a thousand different ones beside it, and the
sculptor alone is to thank for having extricated this
one from the rest, [ The Principles of Psychology (1890)
Dover. 195G S pp* 239~29G\}
"
t.
While there is no general agreement on this point, Sperber [32]
argues that symbolism is a cognitive "„ . .mechanism that alongside the
perceptual and conceptual mechanisms, participates in the construction
of knowledge and in the functioning of memory. ;J [32, p. xii] He con-
trasts symbolic knowledge with semantic knowledge in that the later is
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of categories and classifications while the former is about the world
itself, While it is possible to have an exhaustive, "encyclopedic",
knowledge of Che meaning of a 'trord. it is not possible to have an
exhaustive knowledge of that which the word represents. Such knowledge
involves symbolism of which, "», there is a potentially indefinite
number of new metaphors, dream-like associations..," [p. 93 } f and with
each new metaphor, M ,.» symbolic knowledge is able to take on new know-
ledge and similarly enrich itself, £s [p. 93] Each enumerated symbolic
interpretation suggests new as yet unsuspected potential interpretations
which themselves suggest*.,, etc, etc.
7
Polanyi argues that "all thought contains components of which
we are subsidiarily aware in the focal content of our thinking .
„
5 in
an act of tacit knowing we attend from something for attending to some-
thing else; namely from the first term to the second term of the tacit
relation." [26, p, x] The subsidiary awareness from which we attend to
focal awareness remains tacit, personal .. and beyond explicit analysis f
yet is the basis for knowing our focal awareness to be true, Thus
"One can know more than one can teii." [26, p. 7]
8
Space limits the discussion of the full implications of a hier-
archical theory. Interested readers are directed to [24] or [171
9Bemski [6] s and Feltham and Betaski [9j labeled the set
the "level of experience'**
10
An expected utility maximising DM who spends resources to obtain
information is assumed in this paper. Other criteria s such as min-max
and roax-min, can be analyzed within the above structure by supressing
certain components,
11Although the standard SDT framework assumes act-independent
states of nature [28,27], our formulation allows for act-dependent
states of nature since some writers in accounting [8*9] have partially
dealt with the act-dependent states* Later notes identify where our
analysis extends beyond others *
1°
""Another useful concept of the value of information is called the
conditional value of information [27, § 4.5*1] and is defined as
VCn) - EU(s*|n) - EU 5 (ak) (4)*
EU'(a.) - I [I: D(a.
4
)*<s, |a. fy #f n)]*(y t h)
y S
where a, is the optimal act based on the AC problem specifi-
cation perore the employment of the information system ns
EU(a. ) = Max 2 0(s, .)#(e. la.) for all aeA,
ic , ii s i
aeA 8 J J
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The major difference between (4) and (4)' is chat equation (4) compares
the ex-ante, ex-post (before the decision s after the information) measure
against the ex-ante
s
ex-ante measure, while equation (4) ? compares the
ex-ante, ex-post measure to the ex-ante,, ex-post measure. Ex-ante (be-
for the information) values of EU(a*) and EU ! (a ) are equal* While the
expected values of the equations are the same* the formulation (4)
*
insures the value of "surprise" information to be non-negative. However
>
since we cannot assess the value of V' (n) before the adoption of a given
information system, equation (4) will he used for information systems
choice decisions.
13
Under an act dependent state occurrence framework, as presented
in this paper, the state predicted by a signal may not he unique. That
is, it is possible to have
f(si |ai> yjl? np ) - 1 and
KsJa.,yr T]p)
* 1, yet
S
i *
s
1
'
In^this case the act state pair that determines the outcome 2^ is the pair
(a*,s
?
) such that
Max U(z.,HCs, \& $y-,%),
(a,s)e(A,S) ^ 3 X * l
14See Feltham and Demski [9, p. 625] for more expanded illustration.
15 ~~\
Feltham and Demski [9j treated the probability measures 4>(s)
to he independent of the past acts. It is difficult to rationalize the
act independence assumption for past events when the model calls for act
depencence tor future events oCsia).
Feltham and Demski ? s formulation T9 S p. 625] did not address the
action-effectiveness component, and Keck [1971] labeled it the "Action
Effectiveness Value of Information," hut did not incorporate it into the
decision model.
Mock [22] qalled the increase in the expected utility due to the
revised outcome probabilities, the "Model Value of Information," but
again he did not incorporate it into the decision model,
i g
To do so \4e would commit an error of logical types as developed
by Bertrand Russel, We would be trying to reconcile two statements—one
(s) a statement of a formulated problem, the other (s f ) a statement about
that statement* To discuss the language of (a) s meta language is
necessary, We realize this is a problem without bounds-—"There is no
ultimate meta language which can comment on the system of relationships,
because the mean of analysis—meta language*—like the observer, is also

po-
part of the system being analyzed." [38, p. 94] Our purpose is not to
resolve the problem of ©eta languages, but to discuss its implications
for evaluating information systems, as the relationship of the world
view level to the formulated problem level.
19Very briefly, Lockean inquiry systems (IS) rely on consensus of
empirical data in the absence of theory, Liefonizian IS rely on formal
theory in the absence of data, Kantian IS rely on multiple theories (as
world views) interpreting common data, and Hegelian IS rely on conflict-
ing "deadly enemy" theories debating thesis and antithesis using common
data. Churchman-Singerian IS employ all modes plus implementation,
Kitroff and Fcndy give a good overview of each [211.
20
Adapted from Churchman [3j
.
X
A. special case of this formulation is the certainty case (i.e..
c, = 1 and c. - for i 4> j),
22
Complete faith in one view, c, ~ I ? is sufficient but not
necessary tc achieve the state of C„. = i„
o*
23
Mock [ 22 j has recognized this role of information and has
suggested the following hypothesis?
Anti~learning Information Sys tem-Designs : Infor-
mation systems should be designed such that "learned"
views-o£~the-worid and their underlying assumptions
are continuously challenged
.
It is interesting to note that Mock, using an uncertainty reduction frame-
work for the value of information ? and attending to the formulated problem
level, refers to this essential aspect of the inquiring process as anti-
learning.
24
the problem was adapted from a problem suggested by Professors
Green and Dopuch.
25
It is a trivial exorcise to generate a set of data such that
the residual sum of squares for the two models are identical. Therefore
^
the two cost functions can be assumed to have been estimated based on
the same past data,
26
If we assume that the standards (TCjW
1
,TCjW*) are not con-
sidered to be certain, rather the costs are"1-distributed according to some
known distribution, then we can consider a plausible revision process.
Assume that J
(TC|w ) ~ N(160H-47Q,0 )
(TCjwJ ~ N(80<M-3IQ-KiqZ
s
c
2
)

Then, the credence measures can be revised based on the likelihood iaeasures
of incurring the actual cost given the standard cost equations, P(yjw,)»
PCyjw.) - P(5380|c « 16Of47Q,A«110 5 Q )
P(y|w ) - P(5380JC - 80CH-31Q4-.XQ2 J Q«110,ftn)0'
P(yjw.)?(w.)
J ! i i
It is not certain that the credence levels would be revised according to
Saves' rule, since the product of the revision process must be filtered
through the meaning system level.
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